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Civil wars in Burma: Failures and success
By Vanlalfaka Arakan
The military government and insurgents in Burma
brought down the richest country in South East
Asia to the poorest. The moment Burma got its
independence in from British
government in January 1948, Burma witnessed civil wars between
the government in one side and ethnic insurgents
in the other side. Thus, many intellectual persons and
students who were supposed to be the life of
country left to jungle to fight against the
military government soon after the independent
of Burma.
It is important
to look into political situation during and
before Burma gained its Independent to understand
the insurgencies in Burma. The year before the
colonial British hand over power to Burmese
officially, Aung San and his cabinets were
assassinated on 19 July 1947 when
they were having cabinet meeting ( Maung 315).
Aung San was chairing his cabinet members of
Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League government
when gun men, dressed up as army entered the
room and opened fire indiscriminately that
killed Aung San and his cabenets.
Aung San led
thirty Burmese out of Burma and formed Burma
Independence Army under the guidance of Japanese
forces in 1941 (BIA) to fight the colonial
British (Kyi 18). However, the Japanese began
oppressing Burmese after they invaded Burma in
1942. So Aung San and his colleagues such as
Than Tun (he became the leader of communist who
went underground after independence) formed
Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO) in 1944 to fight
Japanese. AFO was renamed as Anti-Fascist
People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) (Kyi 30-31) that
became the main political party in later years.
The conspiracy
of assassination was taken by higher authority.
Some newspapers and politicians suspected the
role of British government. If the decision was
not taken by higher authority, it would be hard
to assassinate Aung San and his colleagues
because the cabinet meeting was held above the
office of DIG CID (Deputy Inspector General,
Criminal Investigation Department) and next to
the IGP (Inspector General of Police) (Maung
317). The newspapers also stated that there were
two European army officers who drove away in a
jeep immediately after the assignation (Maung
317). The assailants were dressed up as army but
they wore no badges. The polices could have
stopped the assailants but the assailants got
free pass without wearing badges or any
identifiable Identify Cards. Thus, the role of
police also questionable. Though British planned
to hand over power to Burma, the then governor
felt sorry when Aung San delivered a speech in
which he proposed to draft new constitution (Maung
316) that could be seen as British reluctant to
transfer the power. By the governor statement, it
could be acceptable that by eliminating Aung San
and his senior cabinets, the British might have
a chance to rule longer or keep it as dominion
state. After the assignation was made public,
Burmese Communist Party and many newspapers
blamed the British military (Maung 319).
The
police might have different agenda from the
British government. The British might want to
cover up their involvement, so the then DIG CID
U Tun Hla Aung arrested U Saw and his
colleagues. U Saw was sentenced to death. He was
former right wing Prime Minister of Burma who
refused to sign Aung San-Atlee (Prime Minister
of Britain) Agreement to pave independence of
Burma (Suu 46). It seemed that U Saw took
revenge in collaboration with British because
the former was shot and wounded before he sailed
to London with Aung San for negotiation for
independence of Burma (Suu 50).
After
assassinations, U Nu who was the most senior
member of AFPFL took over the Burma from British
in January 1948 but he lost control over
communists and indigenous minorities. According
to Bertil Lintner, the Karen National Union, an
indigenous minority in the east, formed its own
militia named “Karen National Defense
Organization (KNDO), which was commanded by Mahn
Ba Zan (9). As the U Nu government had very few
influence over Burma, the Karen kept their headquartered in Sanchaung near Rangoon. Karen rebellion was soon
joined by Mons in southern Burma by forming its
own “Mon National Defense Organization (MNDO) (Lintner
9).
It seemed that
Karen lost trust in U Nu government after the
assassinations. Lintner wanted to blame the
pre-independence Burma Independence Army for
killing 150 Karens that caused mistrust between
Karen and Burmese (Lintner 8). In his book
‘Burma in Revolt,’ Lintner stated that Sir
Hubert Rance sent letter on 29 June 1947 to Saw
Marshal Shwin, veteran of Force 136. The later
responded to it by saying “With the painful
memories of Myaungmya and Papun atrocities and
other Burmese persecutions first in mind [the
Karens] are not going to give up any arms for
any pretext whatsoever” (Lintner 9). The
slaughters occurred during the anti-fascists
wars and such number of slaughter could happen.
The fact was that Karens were pro-British who
wanted separate state which would be under the
Commonwealth (Lintner 9).
Not only the
line between different races came to conflict,
but Ideologies also came into conflict-
socialists and communists. Than Tun who was
leader of communist openly challenged
socialists. He said, “If they [socialists] dare
to come and attack us, we shall fill the Bagaya
Chauk [a small gully near their party
headquarters] with bones of the socialists” and
he openly accused U Nu, the then Prime Minister
as “fascist”, he further said, “Thakin Nu wants
to live in peace. So let us send him to the most
peaceful place” (Lintner 3). In Burmese,
peaceful place means grave.
The Burmese Communist Party (BCP) was formed in
mid 1939 in Rangoon (Lintner 2). During
pre-independence, BCP was not underground. They
were a part of Aung San’s de facto government
and they fought together with Aung San (Suu 29).
Than Tun, Bo Let Ya and some others was the
founder of Burma Independence Army. Soe was a
radical communist so he was later expelled from
BCP and he later formed his own Communist Party
(Red Flag) and he had been underground
throughout the war against the Japanese (Lintner
2)
U
Nu gave order to arrest communists on March 27,
1948 and his Home Minister raided the communist
headquarters. However, Than Tun and other top
leaders got the news in advance, so top leaders
instructed all party members to leave Rangoon to
rural areas where they prepared to organize
armed struggle (Lintner 4). The top leadership
managed to assemble in May in Kyawkgyi-pauk near Toungoo after the government
ultimatum. They formed a “People’s Liberation
Army of Burma.” As the World War II was over not
long ago, the communist found many arms in
countryside (Lintner 5). After few days from
communist rebellion, the fight against the
government troops broke out on 2 April 1948 in
which communists attacked police stations in
central Burma (Lintner 6). The rebellion was
soon spread to Arakan State in western Burma
too.
The internal stability became so worse that it
affected the armed forces too. On 16 June 1948,
twenty privates of the 1st Burma
Riffles in Pegu district in central Burma
defected to the Communist Party of Burma after
they shot dead their superior officers, and the
sixth Burma Riffles also joined communists (Lintner
6). In Arakan, U Khin Maung, a leader in Arakan
National Council told to this author that the
nineteenth Union Military Police also went
underground. Later, Kachin Riffles also defected
to KNDO.
The People’s Volunteer Organization (PVO), the
war veterans that had been set up on 1 December
1945 (Lintner 6). In Burmese version, it was
known as ‘Pyithu Yebaw Ahphwe.’ Although they
were regarded as welfare organization and
engaged in construction, they wore uniforms,
drilled openly. In fact, it was an armed wing of
the AFPFL during the colonial period (Suu 37).
When it went underground on 28 July 1948, it had
4,000 men or 60% of the total members (Lintner
7).
As rebellion and defection increased, appointing
strong leadership became topic in the top
government circle. Home Minister Kyaw Nyein
proposed Ne Win or Bo Zeya be appointed as
Defense Minister. According to Nyein, “The only
battalion you can rely on is Bo Ne Win’s 4th
Burma Riffles.” The reason Nyein proposed the
change of leader in army was that Lieut. Gen
Smith Dunn, commander in chief of the Burma Army
belonged to indigenous minority. Ne Win got the
post and his rival Bo Zeya and Bo Ye Htut showed
their dissatisfaction (Linter 7). The later two
went underground with their men.
The situation
got worse when U Nu promised before the April
1960 election that Buddhism would be made state
religion that provoked Kachin who were
Christian. On 5 February 1960, the Kachin
Independence Army (KIA) was formed near Lashio
in Shan state with Zau Seng as its commander;
the goal was to liberate Kachin land (Linter
164). They stormed treasury in Lashio that
provided them the financial stability for
starting their army.
U Nu provoked
Shan again April 1957 after shan favored
Independence. The Shan’s constitutional right
to secede was going to come into effect on 4
January 1954 (Lintner 150). Aung San who
was AFPFL leader, and representatives from Shan, Kachin and Chin signed an agreement on 7
February 1947 at Panglong stating that they have the
right to secede if any of these indigenous
wanted – they agreement was known as Panglong
agreement which was done to get independence
from British (Silverstein 104-05). A communist
party in Arakan led by Kyaw Zan Rhee also
demanded a separate “Arakan Republic” (Lintner
175) U Nu told Shan people to take example of
the United States as example of unity. He said,
“The reason why the United States today is the
strongest and most influential nation in the
world is due to the fact that Abraham Lincoln
prevented the southern states from seceding” (Lintner
150). Thus, Shan decided to go underground.
U Nu lost
control of his party and the country affairs.
The AFPFL was split into two groups in 1958. One
faction was led by Ba Swe and it was known as
“Stable” AFPFL and the other was U Nu faction
called “Clean” AFPFL (Lintner 143). The threat
to political stability was worsen when PVO
founded “People’s Comrade Party (PCP) after
around 2,000 PVO members surrendered in May 1958
and their proposed election manifesto were
communism oriented (Lintner 143).
To escape from
troublesome country affairs, U Nu announced over
the Radio Rangoon (Rebels had their own radio
station) at 8 P.M on 26 September 1958 that he
had invited Gen. Ne Win to take the country over
(Lintner 143). In fact, U Nu won a no-confidence
vote in parliament but he invited Gen. Ne Win.
Though Ne Win promised to hand over power to
civilian government within six months, he held
office until December 1960, after the promised
elections had been conducted (Lintner 145).
In the initial
period after independence, U NU had influenced
over only Rangoon, and other part of the country
were under different rebels. It was estimated
that the army had lost 42% of its personal and
45% of all its equipment to rebels (Lintner 79).
Western people thought that Burma would soon be
communist country. The British government
summoned Burmese ambassador to London in 1948
for explanation (Lintner 83).
Ne win who
became the head of the country for two years,
again took over the country. At this time, it
was coup. At 8:50 A.M, March 2 1962, he announced over the
radio that armed forces had taken over the
country. U Nu was arrested at his home and many
people were thrown into jail. (Lintner 169). Soa
Shwe Thaike, the president of Burma was
disappeared mysteriously. Ne Win suspended the
federal 1947 constitution and parliament was
dissolved and formed his own party “Burma
Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) (Lintner
170-01).
The country was
in turmoil again in 1988. This time, it was not
communists or indigenous minorities who revolted
against the government but the students. On August 8, 1988, nation wide
uprising was lunched. Many students, monks and
civilians were shot dead in every corner of the
country. The military went on the air that State
Peace and Development Council, headed by Gen.
Saw Maung, Chief of Staff, was formed to ensure
peace and tranquility (Lentner 137). Curfew was
clamped and the army banned “gathering, walking,
marching in procession, chanting slogans and
delivering speeches.”
As a result,
many students and intellectual fled Burma to
fight against the army. Like their predecessor,
some students went underground and founded ‘All
Burma Students’ Democratic Front’ (ABSDF) on 5
November 1988 at Wakha on Thai-Burma border (Lintner
423). Some students and intellectual formed
civilian organization to lunch their attack on
the military regime at Rangoon.
Since 1948 and
after 1962, the government at Rangoon could not
eliminate insurgents or they could not control
all the land. In the initial part of
independence, rebels controlled almost all part
of the country except Rangoon. The Karen rebels
had their own radio station, which broadcasted
the war, propaganda (Lintner 84) that attracted
many young people and could coordinate the wars.
The Thai government allowed Karen rebels to set
up an unofficial embassy in Bangkok (Lintner
139). The Communists also sent its members to
abroad and it could get support from China.
The rebels also
came together for one platform. In 1949, People
Democratic Front (PDF) was founded by Communist
Party of Burma, Revolutionary Burma Army (RBA) (RBA
emerged with the CPB in 1950), the Arakan
People’s Liberation Party (APLP), etc. then, the
non-communist rebels also formed their own front
known as “Democratic Nationalities United Front”
(DNUF) in 1958. Then, many other united fronts
were founded. Among them, the Democratic
Alliance of Burma (DAB) has changed into
different name from Revolutionary Nationalities
Alliance (RNA) in 1973, Federal National
Democratic Front in 1975, and National
Democratic Front in 1976 to the present name
that was consolidated on November 18, 1988 (Lintner
436).
The Democratic
Alliance of Burma helped the elected Members of
Parliament in formation of the National
Coalition Government of Union of Burma (NCGUB)
on December 14, 1990 (Silverstein 143). The
SLORC or military regime at Rangoon held
election in 1990 but it later issued decree no.
1/90 and arrested all persons who were elected
to parliament (Silverstein 142) and it never
convened any parliament. The NCGUB is now exiled
government of Burma. It was allowed to represent
Burma unofficially in different international
areas such as the UN Commission on Human Rights.
It gradually gained ground in international
arenas.
The rebels as
well as government could not unite firmly and it
seemed it was power struggle. Communists were
divided into white led by Than Tun and Red by
Soe. Communist Party of Burma that was later
dissolved in 1989 or it could be say that it
existed no more. Karen were divided into two
group based on faith – Christian and Buddhist.
In December 1994, Buddhist Karens founded
Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization and went
over to Burma army (Silverstein 150). In western
Burma, Arakan rebels were divided into different
faction such as Arakan Liberation Party (ALP)
and Arakan Army (AA). The Shan which is the
biggest state in Burma has many factions. There
were Shan State Independence Army in 1960, the
Shan National United Front (SUNF) in 1961,
Tailand Revolutionary Army (TRA), etc (Rajah
139).
The root of militarism in Burma was caused by
some socialists and U Nu, the
former prime minister of Burma. Burmese
Socialist Party leader Ba Swe favored increase
of army participation in politics (Lintner 143).
Though U Nu won no-confidence vote in 1958, he
handed over power to Ne Win. U Nu could
pacify dissidents by holding new election, and
he could have taken up responsible as acting
prime minister but he didn’t do
so.
The military
regime initiated cease-fire with rebels. Many
indigenous minorities entered into cease-fire
agreement with the SLORC. The New Mon State
Party (MNSP) and Mong [Shan] Tai Army got
ceasefire agreement with SLORC in 1995 and 1996.
Moreover, many rebels just surrendered to the
army. The other reason is that there is no
balance of power or resources in rebels. Eastern
rebels are Karen, Mon, Kachin and many other
groups which are very strong in manpower and
financial. In contrast to the east, western
rebels such as Chin and Arakan have no man power
nor resources that make SLORC more concentration
in the east side.
The lack of
unity among rebels will make army stronger and
stronger because they have international
recognition as government and the government is
under one command, and their weapons are more
superior to rebels. The rebels now have no
chance to overthrow like 1950s when many leaders
were against each other
References:
Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future.
Ed. Robert I. Rotberg. Washington, D.C: The
World Peace Foundation, 1998.
Burma: The challenge of change in a divided
society. Ed. Peter Carey. New York: St.
Martin's P, 1997.
Lintner, Bertil. Outrage: Burma's struggle
for Democracy. 2nd ed. London:
White Lotus,
1990.
Lintner, Bertil. Burma in Revolt. San
Francisco: Westview Press, 1994.
Maung, Khin. Telephone interview. 9 Mar. 2004.
Maung , U M. Burmese Nationalist Movements.
Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii
P, 1990.
Silverstein, Josef. Burmese Politics: The
dilemma of national unity. New Brunswick,
NJ:
Rutgers UP, 1980.
Suu Kyi, Aung S. Aung San of Burma. 2nd
ed. Edinburgh: The University of Queensland
Press, 1991.
Victor, Barbara. The Lady: Aung San Suu Kyi.
Boston: Faber and Faber, 1998
©Vanlalfaka
Arakan
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