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Indigenous and
tribal peoples shall enjoy the full measure of human
rights and
fundamental freedoms
without hindrance or discrimination.
Article 3.1,
International Labour Convention (No. 169)
“Reality has been
colonized by the development discourse”
Arturo Escobar
Introduction
Today Myanmar military
junta is a one of rhetoric rulers in the world
especially in the name of development process in
ethnic regions, since Myanmar was integrated with
135 ethnic groups.
Military regime forbidden international mass media,
strictly control to domestic media and use it as
their mouthpiece is a good tool of tricky to world
family, they are as the real developer for ethnic
and border regions by doing build the bridges, build
the roads and many quantitative for-show and
so-called development works. Military regime’s
attempt to disguise to world is seem successful.
Because often I face the similar question by
westerners that ‘why don’t you like your military
government, because they have done a lot of
developing works for people?’. Answer for this
question is as well as the main cause for ethnic
conflicts between military regime and various ethnic
groups. If I follow the usage of Curtis W. Lambrecht,
we can say Myanmar development process by Military
regime as ‘Oxymoronic Development’ not only
ethnic regions as well as throughout the country.
Ethnicity was likely
less important in the pre-colonial period than it is
today; for as state nationalism has developed so
ethnic nationalism has arisen. The population then
was sparse in an extensive land, and an increased
population of any ethnicity was desirable for
economic and political reasons as enhancing military
capacity, the labor force, and the tax base. Such
expansionist policies over diverse ethnic groups
also demonstrated the political efficacy of the
ruler. Ethnic nationalism is a more modern
phenomenon.
Background
Myanmar is
a country of proud cultural and historic traditions,
and it is rich in natural resources. But nearly half
a century of conflict has left Myanmar with a legacy
of deep-rooted problems and weakened its ability to
cope with a growing host of new ones: economic and
social collapse; hundreds of thousands of refugees
and displaced people; environmental degradation;
narcotics; and AIDS. These problems touch on the
lives of all Myanmar citizens. But it is members of
ethnic minority groups who have suffered the most,
and who have had even less say over their lives and
the destiny of their peoples than the majority
‘Burmese’. Many minorities claim that a policy of
‘Burmanization’ is manifest. Amidst the upheavals,
gross human rights abuses have been committed,
including the conscription, over the years, of
millions into compulsory labor duties, the
ill-treatment or extrajudicial executions of ethnic
minority villagers in war-zones, and the forcible
relocation of entire communities.
Today
ethnic minority groups are estimated to make up at
least one third of Myanmar’s population of 45
million and to inhabit half the land area. There has
been no attempt to take an accurate ethnic survey
since the last British census in 1931, which itself
contained many errors. Over 100 different dialects
and languages have been identified in Myanmar, and
many unique ethnic cultures have survived late into
the 20th century. The ethnic minority crisis is one
of the most central issues facing Myanmar and its
neighbors today. All the regions along Myanmar’s
4,016-mile-long land border are inhabited by ethnic
minorities, often with historic ties in neighboring
states, and armed ethnic opposition groups still
police many of Myanmar’s frontier crossings and
trade routes. The British built a two-tier system of
administration. ‘Ministerial Burma’, dominated by
the Burmese majority, and the ‘Frontier Areas’,
where most ethnic minorities lived. This strict
division set the different ethnic groups on very
separate roads towards political and economic
development. As a result, the new Union of Burma
which eventually gained independence in 1948 was
very different from any nation or state in history.
The Colonial Legacy and National Ethnic Groups
All colonial powers in Southeast Asia
established strict administrative boundaries where
none previously existed, and extended the authority
of the center out laterally to the arbitrarily
designated borders that ignored ethnicity, language,
cultural patterns and unities, sometimes watersheds
or other geographic features, and often complex
systems of multiple tributary relationships that
were deemed under European dominance to have no
place in the modern world.
When the British granted independence to
Myanmar in 1948, they left behind a country troubled
by colonial rule with a weak regime, a restless
society, and strategic vulnerability to both China
and India. Myanmar was a profoundly insecure state -
insecure about its own internal system and about its
place in the region and the world. The colonial
legacy produced two tendencies in Myanmar society
and government: a strong sense of nationalism and a
weak understanding of internationalism and its
importance for development. Perceived threats to
national unity were forces behind both the 1962 and
1988 military coups, but the international
implications of that iron-fisted rule and the
disregard for the 1990 election results were far
greater than the Myanmar government probably
predicted. Myanmar must gain a greater understanding
of nationalism’s effects on internationalism if it
expects to survive and grow in the region.
Silverstein
(1980) discusses how Burmese politician leaders
during the independence and post-independence
periods defined the concept of national unity
differently. Myanmar comprises with eight
major national ethnic groups: Kachin, Kayah, Kayin,
Chin, Mon, Bamar, Rakhine and Shan. Bamar, the
largest national ethnic group, constitutes 70%,
Karen 9%, Shan 8%, Rakhine 5%, Mon 2.5%, Chin 2.5%
and Kachin 2%. Dr. Ba
Maw,
the wartime head of state under the Japanese
occupation, insisted on the essential sameness and
unity of all people living in what currently
constitutes Burma. He claimed that the British
colonialists had introduced artificial separations
that divided Burmese and ethnic minorities. This
view suited those Burmese nationalists who sought to
sweep differences under the carpet in order to
achieve their goal of a strong, unitary state.
General Aung San, the father of state, on the other
hand, recognized the different cultures and
histories of the various peoples living in the
territory now called Myanmar and instead emphasized
the need to devise some form of political unity that
took that diversity into account. This was huge
problem for national reconciliation and it is need
to retrospect colonial period.
Civilizing Attempts and
its Impacts
In former
Burma, systematic civilization attempts to
peripheral people or ethnic people start in colonial
period by British government and Christian missions.
I want to emphasize religious case. At that
time and also up to now, Buddhism does not teach to
propagate its faith by force. It is against the
fundamental belief and doctrine of Buddhism to act
in such a manner. Theravada Buddhism strictly
prohibits monks from participating in any kind of
political or commercial activities. It is also
tolerant towards non-Buddhist faiths. This tolerant
attitude has led to the idea of religious
non-interference. Thus, Myanmar is probably one of
few countries where the major religions live
together harmoniously. This non-interference concept
was behind the response of Burmese Buddhists to
Christian Missions: “Our religion is good for us,
yours for you”. So the
first thing is Christian Missions cannot convince to
Buddhist majority, and the second thing is, but,
they can freely Christianization to peripheral
people, undeveloped ethnic people without
interference by Buddhist majority in remote and hill
areas.
In Myanmar
case, religion (Christian) is a tool for colonial
rule of British regime. Because by using religion,
British made rule and divide system, and it prevent
to unity between hill people and plain people. Not
only divide religion but also possible national
spirit among local people. Western missions create
writing system form some certain ethnic group and
create education opportunities in local and abroad.
Some ethnic groups give up their writing system in
Burmese alphabet and adapt by English alphabet
system. Western missions success their works in
Myanmar, especially in hill regions. Unfortunately,
I think, that Christianization also became a seed of
today’s national reconciliation problem. This view
maybe controversial.
At that time,
in the Taungoo area thousands of Burmese, Karen and
Pa-O were organized by Abbot Mayan Chaung
to rebel against the British. Similarly another
abbot, U Thuria of Hanthawaddy
organized the Karens and Burmese in the area to
rebel against the colonial regime. But, according to
Karen record, for the most part the Karens,
especially those taught by the missionaries,
remained loyal to the crown, colonial regime. The
problem for build common national identity was start
at that time. Those ethnic groups loyal to colonial
regime after converse to Christian, but when British
attempted occupied those regions, all ethnic groups
against them with their poor weapons. Later Burmese
attacked to British were assumed by those ethnic
groups as attack to them. The Christian missionary
priest wrote in his letter to other priest that
‘there was a very strong Christian against Buddhist
leaning that saw the rebellion not so much has the
Burmese people against the Colonialists, but rather
Buddhist Burmese against Christian Karen’. And he
remarked ‘the strangest of all is the presence of
the pongyees (Buddhist monks) on the
battlefield. This is unheard of in history’.
He also expresses his convinced to local people as
that ‘my Karens usually interpret this as God's sign
that Buddhism is to be destroyed forever’.
Immediately
after independence in 1948, serious divisions
emerged between Burmese and non-Burmese political
leaders, who favored a less unified state. Between
1948 and 1962, armed conflicts broke out between
some of these minority groups and the central
government. Although some groups signed peace
accords with the central government in the late
1980s and early 1990s, others are still engaged in
armed conflict. From that
period to today, national reconciliation is the fist
and importance priority for Myanmar, and as in the
words of Don McCaskill, the challenge of
establishing itself as a distinctive nation-state.
On the base of this conflict and later
maladministration of military regime make Myanmar as
unrest and poorest country.
In post-colonial
period, authorities try to censors the passages of
the Old Testament and the Koran that may appear to
approve the use of violence against nonbelievers.
And then, all politico-socio situations are
complicated and become the endless problems. Today,
almost all Myanmar scholar and politician are agree
renaming as ‘Myanmar’ to represent all national
majority and minority groups, the name of ‘Burma’
suppose as represent to Burmese majority. While all
are against current ruling regime, they agree to
call Myanmar, although most western countries do not
accept as Myanmar, without having sense on ‘name’
and at behind these deep national reconciliation
problems.
Colonial Legacy and
Development
In an
evaluation of economic progress in Southeast Asia in
the immediate aftermath on the Second World War, the
major economies in the region had grown at widely
diverging rates. Philippines recovered rapidly from
the devastation of war and occupation. Thailand and
then British Malaya (including Singapore) also
recovered quite rapidly and achieved positive per
capita growth rates in the 1950s. But in Myanmar
progress has taken the form primarily of restoring
prewar levels of per capita production; it is
unlikely that gains prewar levels have been
achieved. By the early 1950s, per capita GDP in
Myanmar, in international dollars corrected for
terms of trade fluctuations, was less than 30 per
cent of that in the Philippines, about 30 per cent
of the Thai figure, and less than half that in
India. Myanmar’s output contraction in the 1930s was
entirely due to the very poor performance of the
agricultural sector. The newly independent
government gave high priority to reform of both the
land tenure system and agricultural credit, ‘the
twin evils’ of prewar Myanmar agriculture. A
prosperous and productive agricultural sector was
viewed as the foundation on which a more diversified
economy could be constructed (William Kirk 1990).
The government was also determined to use taxation
and other revenues to increase spending on
infrastructural development and health, education
and welfare. In contrast to the prewar economy where
Myanmar had made large subventions to the budget of
British India and received little back in return,
there was a determination to use national resources
to improve the welfare of the entire population.
But, later
ethnic and communist insurgencies necessitated a
sharp increase in military expenditures, which
accounted for around 30 per cent of total budget
spending for much of the decade. Although
expenditure on infrastructure development and on
health and education did increase, relative to GDP,
the bold ambitions of the immediate
post-independence era to build a welfare state in
Myanmar were only very partially realized. There
were those who argued that Myanmar’s failure to
achieve prewar levels of per capita GDP during the
1950s was not just due to the unfavorable colonial
legacy, wartime devastation, and high government
expenditures on defense. Myanmar economist Dr.Hla
Myint (1967) pointed out that while all the
countries of South East Asia shared a common
reaction after independence to what might be termed
‘the colonial economic pattern’. Since a large share
of these exports was produced by the foreign-owned
mines and plantations, the governments of
post-colonial countries took care to guarantee the
security of foreign property and freedom to remit
profits, and generally created a favorable economic
environment which encouraged the foreign enterprises
not only to continue their existing production but
also to undertake new investments, to strike out
into new lines of exports and to introduce new
methods of production and organization.
In contrast,
Dr. Hla Myint continued, the political leadership of
Myanmar at that time “were obsessed by the fear”
that once foreign enterprises were allowed to
reestablish themselves or expand their operations,
they would resume their old stranglehold over the
economy, and re-impose the colonial economic pattern
whereby most profits were remitted abroad, and the
local populations gained little benefit from the
exploitation of the economy’s abundant natural
resources (Anna Booth (2006). Dr. Hla Myint argued
that both countries did little to attract new
investment and indeed nationalized a number of
foreign-owned firms. They also adopted hostile
policies to their Chinese and Indian minorities, so
that many left either for their ancestral homelands
or to settle in third countries. Nor did they
encourage entrepreneurship among the indigenous
majority; in both countries smallholder producers of
export crops were taxed through export taxes and
marketing boards, and there was little investment in
infrastructure or new cultivation technologies which
would directly benefit smallholder producers.
The
official view was that a unity of culture existed
among the peoples of the Union and that existing
differences are only expressions of the same culture
at different stages of development.
Since post-independence period, from the time
of General Nay Win to the present, Burmese language
became not only the official common language of all
ethnic groups of the Union but also the only medium
of instruction for all education in Myanmar. A
crucial problem for the minority ethnic Christians
is that they do not want to use of Burmese as common
language and it is assume that the government
attempts to eliminate the long existing languages of
minority ethnic Christians. To allow using their own
languages, the problems are reinvention history and
its can creating to barrier for national
reconciliation, could spread hatred and hostility
among different people groups. Under the
maladministration of military regime, all worries of
plain people, misinterpretation of hill (especially
Christian) people, and chaos are lead to advantage
for ruling military generals and national
reconciliation for Myanmar is still dream in a
deadlock.
Relocation as Development
Process
In many
respects, the present political and ethnic crisis in
Myanmar is underpinned by the collapse of the
economy and the economic and social restructuring
now taking place. According to rough estimates,
Manar has been losing as much as 800,000 hectares of
forest cover annually since 1988. At current rates
of felling, all its teak wood reserves, once the
largest and best maintained in Asia, will have gone
within ten years. In many parts of the Karen, Kayah,
Mon, and Shan States, large areas have been stripped
of all forest growth. Similar large-scale
deforestation has taken place along the Chinese
border in the Kachin State, of equal concern, in the
1991 monsoon season heavy flooding occurred for the
first time in several remote valleys in both the
Karen and Kachin States, where some of the heaviest
logging was taking place: over 140 people died.
Local villagers had no doubt that uncontrolled
forest destruction was to blame.
A typical
threat of extrajudicial action by the military was
made under an order dated 7 December 1992 issued by
the 'Committee for the Relocation of Villages' in
Paan, the Karen State capital. The inhabitants of
over 40 Karen villages west of the Salween River
were commanded to move with their belongings to
designated armycontrolled settlements within three
weeks. Those refusing to comply were warned: Any
rice and cattle left behind will be confiscated if
found by the military columns. If any villagers hide
in the forest, they will be shot and arrested.
When a foreign journalist inquired about the large
numbers of deaths of Karenni villagers during the
construction of the Aungban-Loikaw railway,
Lieutenant-Colonel Than Han of the BADF replied:
Every day people are dying. It's a normal thing.
While admitting that ethnic minority villagers
did not wish to leave their homes, he complained:
They do not understand that the military is carrying
out the rail project in their interests (Smith).
Myanmar's
continuing political and economic crisis is also
forcing ever greater numbers of inhabitants to leave
their homes. In mid-1994 over 300,000 refugees,
mostly ethnic minorities, were officially recorded
at camps in neighboring Thailand, Bangladesh, India
and China. Of these, some 75,000 were in Thailand
(largely Karen, Mon and Karenni) and over 200,000
(predominantly Muslims) in Bangladesh. There were
also an estimated 10,000 Kachin refugees in China
and a similar number of Naga, Chin and other
refugees in India. Unofficial numbers, however, were
estimated at over three times that figure, meaning
that over one million exiles and migrants were
subsisting precariously around Myanmar's troubled
borders. These figures tell only half the story. By
most estimates, there are also over one million
internally displaced persons inside Myanmar itself,
including relocated villagers from the war-zones,
those forcibly resettled in recent SLORC development
projects, and refugees still trying to survive in
the hills. However, unlike the refugees abroad,
these internal victims of Myanmar's political crisis
have virtually no access to international aid or
support.
Dams and Hydroelectricity:
Who benefits?
For many
minorities, perhaps the most controversial plans are
eight proposed hydroelectric projects with the
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand,
Located along the Moei, Salween (Than Lwin) and Mae
Kok rivers, the dams would have a combined
generating capacity of 6,399.75 megawatts, requiring
an investment of over US$ five thousand million,
much of which is being solicited from international
agencies such as the Asian Development Bank. To
date, the indigenous peoples in the area have not
been consulted: most of the electricity and water
would go to Thailand, the profits to military
regime. The environmental consequences for the
region and the Karen peoples, in particular, would
be enormous. The two largest dams would be on the
Salween River in the heartland of Karen country in
territory controlled by the KNU since Myanmar's
independence in 1948. Thousands of villagers stand
to be displaced, and no studies have yet been
started on such environmental dangers as loss of
fisheries, silting, or the destruction of the
eco-system.
Dam Politics: Sustainable
Development or Destroying in Long Term?
Regional
economics integration has been shaped by growing
economic and political influence, and consequently
demand for natural resources is increase. Dam
projects are popular and geared towards selling
electricity and water across national boundaries.
Civil society responses to current development
approaches and trends in the Mekong reflect the
complexities brought on by increased
regionalization, with multi-scale networks being
formed within as well as between the Mekong
countries.
Regionalization from below has created dissent to
specific projects, intergovernmental process and the
non-participatory and non-transparent deals,
policies and programs.
Unfortunately, I think in the South Asia,
regionalization is imbalance, almost all about
China. The more China hungry energy, the more it
needs to protect the notorious country like Myanmar.
China’s plans for damming the upper Salween serve
the Myanmar military junta’s dual goals of securing
territories in conflict regions and generating
revenue to further entrench the military regime.
Dams are not sure for development after onward, but
sure for political and commercial interest in
current Myanmar. So I want to name as ‘dam
politics’. Apart form various impacts by dam
building, in Shan State of Myanmar, 400,000 people
are suffer from force relocated to build only one
dam. Other human right violation and destroying
environment were endless before and after dams.
China and
Thailand are the two main foreign investors in
military rule Myanmar.
Rivers and her peoples are marginalized, not only in
Myanmar, including other poor Southeast Asian
countries. Sadly tragedy is that, in Myanmar, dam
projects are greatly affected to ethnic people,
because rivers are in their settle regions. More
tragedy is that there are lacks of civil society to
represent ethnic peoples’ voice and military
repression is beyond control. Results are not only
ecological degradation but also loss of local
livelihoods for thousands of people. In Yunnan,
China, news report that by the year 2020 at least
500,000 people will be resettled to make way for
hydropower development in Yunnan province.
I feel that those government and it crony abuse the
word ‘development’ for their interests. China making
political, social and ecological problem with other
countries as well as it own. Over the past 50 years,
more than 16 million people have been displaced by
dams of various types, and as many as 10 million of
those people are still living in poverty.
Dam
projects are, for military junta, the subject of
getting favor form such country like China, Thailand
including India to making cover their political
power seizing from the critics of global family. And
dam also the weapon of ethnic cleansing. Myanmar has
135 ethnic group and almost all of ethnic regions
are full of conflicts and place of fighting. After
independent, majority Burmese and all ethnic groups
had agreement to follow federalism.
But military coup for that they cannot accept
federalism. Until now, military talk in a loud voice
national reconciliation, but any practices don’t
follow it. The main reason for to control political
power is nothing, but for rich natural resources and
exploitable position of those ethnic regions.
According to federal agreement, ethnic groups can
have their own region to manage themselves including
natural resources.
Now under
several dam projects, along the Salween River, all
ethnic groups are targets. Not only for relocate,
but also force labor and portering, harassment,
extortion and random killing are common.
Thai-Myanmar border become a refugee place for
ethnic people without having recognized citizenship,
while Thai business group invest of large amount in
their native regions. According to a report, 92,500
ethnic people were internally displaced in 2005.
Almost all of people are forcibly relocated and all
people, including children, pregnant women and
elderly have to walk through the hills to distant
relocation site. That site is lacking proper food
and medical care. That is true. But some information
like that women are constantly raped by armed
soldiers and those who are captured escaping are
kill,
are too exaggerate.
In the
region, China as a main driven of regional economics
integration, I don’t believe it can sustain any
situation. Although China influences other
countries’ economics decision, leave other countries
alone, China itself cannot control to slow and
steady it running rate. It looks like time boom. Dam
projects seem a good business for country income,
but I found that its profit is not for majority,
only for the handful of bourgeois and autocrats. It
obvious that environmentally, ecological system was
destroys and socially, thousand of people are abuse
and still snick in poverty. Where is development?
Governments used to claim that ‘those people should
to sacrifice for development’, but I don’t found any
effective development process in my sense. But I am
sure to say that current generation ‘sacrifice’ for
their so-called development, ‘a modern utopia’,
not only that, future generation will be paying the
prices for those impacts of dam politics. And I
considering that no one can prevent effectively them
and they do with their logical short term visions
are not so strange, not to be surprise. Because any
religious predict the batter world in future, but
the day of destroy the world, with their own
references.
Politics, Environment and
Development
Although I
was a journalist whom thought as ‘know something of
everything’, I didn’t have awareness much about of
Myanmar policy and practice of environment through
development. At the first year of my studies in
Chuang Mai University, I get a lot of brain storming
concerning with environmental, political, gender
issues and various aspects of social issues. I start
to rethink all situations of Myanmar thoroughly as
far as I have known. And I found myself that I can
see clearly what happen inside of Myanmar before and
now, by the invaluable teachings of my Ajarns.
Here I want to review environmental politics and the
politics of development of Myanmar. How these three
sectors related and affect each other?
Recently, I
have read an interview with Dr. Mahathir Mohamad,
who expresses his view on Myanmar as that they
(current ruling Generals) may love their country,
but they make many wrong behaviors in politics.
This is a good point of what happen in inside of
Myanmar, here in terms of to harmony between
environmental politics and development. Since the
ruling Generals took power by military coup in 1988,
the regime has increased use of Myanmar’s natural
resources. Urgently needing hard currency to expend
its military and engage in political and armed
destruction of various insurgent groups, the regime
began exploiting the country’s natural resources
irresponsibly at a shocking rate. If we study the
case of Myanmar, we can see how politics play the
critical role in environmental conservation and to
achieve development in Third World country. The lack
of good governance is the main cause of destroying
nature. Scholars and observers point out that
sustainable development in Southeast Asia should be
understood with the political-ecology approach
(Bryant and Parnwell 1996)
The
political situation in Myanmar is at a critical
stage. At this political stage, Myanmar has no
constitution, no national legislative body, and no
independent judiciary system. In other words, at
present Myanmar lacks the fundamental structures of
a stable society, such as political accountability,
good governance, and effective and equitable law
enforcement, that are vital to the sustainable
management of environmental and human resources (Tun
Myint 2003). Since lack of these fundamental
structure, there are many challenges appear in
environmental governance. And it is difficult to
express the concerning of people in environment and
development process.
In the
West, a major focus of environmental issues has been
on the diagnosis of continuing decline in the
productivity of the world's renewable natural
resources. It is generally seen as the result of
human activity. People now are destroying the
resource base of people in the future. Developing
countries constitute the larger part of the world's
population and are therefore also responsible for
the major proportion of all human activity. But some
claim that in those countries, concern about
ecological decline is much less evident. In its
place is found an increasingly eager demand for
improvement of living conditions today through more
even distribution of existing resources.
To follow
this discourse, military regime blame as that
Myanmar’s environmental problems were a result of
‘underdevelopment’, by the poor who use it and also
as the colonial legacy. As the nation try to catch
up with the rest of the world in terms of
development, this trend is causing serious concern
for many environmental issues in Myanmar. This
national quest and campaign for ‘development’ has
met the dilemma of ‘sustainable development’, where
natural resources are the only available source of
development capital (Tun Myint). If human activity
causes ecological decline, it also lowers the limits
of what can realistically be aimed for through
development to improve the conditions of human
activity. This conflict between behavior and
ambition underlies much political activity (Spooner
1984).
As a policy
response to address environmental issues, military
regime established the National Commission on
Environmental Affairs (NCEA) in 1990 to ‘educate the
public about environmental awareness’. NCEA is also
charged with the duty to formulate a ‘comprehensive
national environmental strategy’ in pursuit of a
‘modern and developed nation’ (NCEA Report, 1992).
In 1994, NCEA adopted the National Environmental
Policy. According to NCEA, the National
Environmental Policy has two major tasks: (1)
institutional development, and (2) carrying out the
National Environmental Action Plan (FAO Report,
1997). But what is the reality beyond policy!
But
military regime’s policy of environment is on paper.
The policy on paper in Myanmar is usually not
practiced by the military rulers themselves. What is
happening in reality is different from the policy on
paper. In the absence of a constitution, a national
parliament, and a legislative body, there is at
present no appropriate and working mechanism in
Myanmar to address environmental problems. According
to the National Environmental Policy, NCEA is
presently focusing on promoting public awareness for
environmental protection and securing the active
participation and cooperation of the public in
environmental conservation efforts. Although Myanmar
has a number of environmental laws and regulations,
it lacks the institutions to carry out ‘protection
and conservation of environment’ so as to achieve
‘sustainable development’ by implementing these
laws.
Since
Myanmar gained independence, NCEA and its policy
framework is the first and only initiative that
designed to address environmental issues in Myanmar.
The military regime also announced that it fully
supports the concepts of ‘sustainable Development’
for Myanmar ‘to become a modern and developed
nation’. The conceptual framework of ‘sustainable
development’ is ‘to ensure that it meets the need
of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs’ (Our
Common Future 1986).
Myanmar
junta often proudly claimed that Myanmar is ‘rich in
natural resources’, but it is being threatened by
over exploitation of natural resources while
political crisis. So some observer argue that
Myanmar no longer possesses like mentioned status of
being rich in natural resources. One of the most
visible threats to Myanmar’s environment today is
the rapid depletion of many forests. Independent
observers’ estimates that remaining forest cover in
Myanmar at closer to 30 percent of its total land
area. The Rainforest Action Network
has calculated Myanmar’s annual deforestation rate
at 800,000 to 1 million acres a year. The rate of
deforestation in Myanmar is one of the five highest
in the world.
To
illustrate the gap between law and practice in
environmental politics, we should see the border
timber trade, especially with China. After 1980s,
China promoted economics relation with neighboring
countries. Myanmar has made several requests to
china for the exploitation of its forest resources
jointly with China, a record said. Timber has simply
become the number one business on the China-Myanmar
border.
During the dry season, 150 to 200 timber trucks
cross the border per day (Su Yongge 2000). Here
another question is rise that where these money go
after selling these natural resources. Intelligence
sources estimated that Myanmar spent between US$1.5
billion and US$2 billion to purchase arms from China
alone in 1990s. It is the evidence of that they
spent large amount of money in military sector
rather than social and economics development sector.
And other place where money keep is the own interest
of junta. The emergence of close links between
political and economic elites resulted in widespread
environmental degradation since the politicians use
the resource lease to gain personal or political
interest (Bryant and Parnwell). Myanmar people are
still coping with lack of health care, poor
education access and very lowest status in
physically and mentally.
Myanmar, a
country that has suffered a great deal from
political instability, war, and repression, stands
to lose much of its remaining natural resources at
an alarming rate. The military regime’s protection
and conservation of natural resources and
environment as a national endeavor, has been far
away to reach the achievement. The implementation of
the National Environmental Policy has yet to find
appropriate institutional mechanism. Although
decision-making are crucial elements for good
governance, the big junta who hallucinate himself as
‘a great king’ is strongly hold decision maker role
without knowing even any sense of politics, apart
from the vision of environment and development.
Ecology and
development are unavoidably interrelated. Particular
development, insofar as it is directed towards
increased food and other crop production, begs the
ecological question of the long-term productivity of
resources. Ecological processes do frustrate
development. If we can’t create the harmony between
politics and environmental management, we can’t
dream development. At the same time that harmony
should be ‘in time’, before deplete all natural
resources. If not, not only the given single
country, but all countries would pay the prices for
ecological impacts.
Ecology has no borders. So it should be possible to
persuade people - all people: politicians, as well
as planners, and local to accede to their
imperatives and develop within the limits they set
down.
Culture, Education,
Language and Religion
For many
citizens, the open discrimination against ethnic
minority groups in matters of culture, education,
language and religion is the most disturbing
evidence of a long-term policy of ‘Burmanization’
carried out by all governments since independence.
The Karen National Union has attacked the
‘annihilation, absorption and assimilation’ of the
Karen people, and asserted that: “The Karen are much
more than a national minority. We are a nation.”
Cultural discrimination against ethnic minority
groups, who make up over a third of the population,
runs counter to the constitutional right of every
citizen in Myanmar to freedom of speech,
association, language, education and religion.
Despite the imposition of one-party rule in 1962,
equal ethnic, religious and cultural rights were
still guaranteed under the BSPP's 1974 constitution.
But all these fundamental human rights have long
since been whittled away. Long before the 1988
democracy uprising, newspapers, schools and
universities had been repeatedly shut down at the
first sign of protest.
A subtle
mixture of discrimination and laws controls all
literature and expressions of ethnic minority
cultures. Ethnic minority writers and teachers who
oppose government restrictions or encourage
expressions of cultural identity and the use of
their own languages have faced considerable
harassment. For example, two Mon intellectuals, Nai
Nawn Dho, a Buddhist monk, and Nai Manawchrod, a
Rangoon University lecturer, were reportedly
arrested in January 1991 for attempting to promote
the use of the Mon language. And, in perhaps the
most disturbing incident, in August 1990 82 year-old
U Oo Tha Htun, the distinguished Rakhine historian
and parliamentary candidate, died allegedly as a
result of ill-treatment in jail.
Over the
past 30 years, the multi-cultural system of
education envisaged by Aung San and ethnic minority
leaders in the 1947 constitution has been replaced
by a highly Burmanized and doctrinaire curriculum in
which any expression of minority cultures is denied.
In a country of such obvious ethnic diversity, this
discrimination appears quite deliberate. For
example, although the 1974 constitution allowed for
minority languages to be taught in schools, in
government-controlled areas today there is no
official teaching or research in any minority
language in either secondary or tertiary education.
Cultural and religious studies have been equally
repressed. Such discrimination is not only a major
impediment to the survival and expression of
minority languages and cultures, but it also
discriminates against ethnic minority citizens who
first have to learn Burmese as the only language for
education and government.
For those
ethnic minority students who aspire to higher
education, the regional college system is inherently
discriminatory. This system was introduced in the
mid- 1970s to keep Myanmar's restive student body at
home, away from the main conurbations, and it has
since remained extremely difficult for prospective
ethnic minority students from outlying areas to
travel to the central cities for university
education, due to lack of funds, contacts and the
allotment of places. With the exception of Moulmein,
which was upgraded in 1986, there are no
universities in ethnic minority areas, only state
colleges, hich local students are encouraged to
attend. The government's flagship for ethnic
minority education has been theAcademy for the
Development of National Groups in the Sagaing
Division. But the Academy is in the heartland of
Burmese culture and its initial purpose, when set up
in 1964, was to propagate the 'Burmese Way to
Socialism' in minority areas. To much fanfare, it
was upgraded into a university in 1991, but this did
not impress minority leaders: they say the
university's only purpose is to provide Burmese
language teachers to spread the philosophy of the
SLORC's new ‘Myanmar’ Buddhist culture in borderland
areas.
In response
to requests for international aid, ethnic group
leaders have argued that only aid which goes
directly to indigenous peoples will ever enable the
local inhabitants to develop their region, alleviate
poverty and eradicate the scourge of narcotics. The
official policy of the Burmese government is to
suppress opium growing. This is a ‘window dressing’
policy only to impress the West. In the past the
United States has even given the Burmese aid to
carry out that policy. While, in fact, the Burmese
officials encourage opium growing and enable its
marketing for their own benefit.
Individual rights and
collective rights
Human
rights mainly concern the relationship between the
state and individuals. However, human rights do not
explicitly address the collective rights of ethnic
people who would like to maintain their
particularities such as culture, custom, language,
literature, ancestral domains etc. It has become
doubtful that particularity of the ethnic people can
be maintained while human rights are being promoted.
Ethnic
people have practiced different cultural systems in
Myanmar for hundreds of years. All ethnic peoples
have their own languages and the majority of them
have their own literature. Unfortunately, under the
rule of the military junta, learning and teaching of
ethnic literatures has not been allowed in
government schools. Only Burmese (Myanmar), the
major language of the majority Burmese people, is
permitted. From 1992 to 1997, under the military's
program claiming to preserve cultural inheritance in
support of "national unity", the junta
re-established "Kambawza Thardi", the ancient palace
of Burmese King Bayinnaung. The military spent 170
million Kyat (Burmese Currency) in doing so56. Under
the same program, the military junta allotted 1.3
million Kyat for the extension of Shan State
library57. At the same time no project was allowed
for the Shan people to preserve the ancient palaces
of Shan hereditary Chiefs such as Chaofas or Sawbwas.
Instead, Keintong Haw, palace of Keintong Chaofas in
eastern Shan State, was destroyed and replaced with
a hotel.
The Karen
people love their national flag very much as a
symbol of the dignity of their nationality.
Unfortunately, in a surrender ceremony for a group
of Karen rebel soldiers, the SPDC vice-chairman,
Lieutenant General Maung Aye, lay down the Karen
national flag and stepped on it. These brutal
actions of the SPDC leaders strike at the hearts of
the non-Burmese ethnic people. These are only some
of the dealings of the military junta with ethnic
nationalities.
Conclusion
In Myanmar,
there is no conflict between either Burmese and
non-Burmese people or between non-Burmese ethnic
nationalities themselves. Throughout the history of
Myanmar, the source of ethnic ‘trouble’ has been the
extension of military power and a centralization
process by the rulers. As a result, the
rights of non-Burmese ethnic nationalities were
mainly neglected and peace, justice, equity and
fairness were lost. Under the SPDC, which practices
stronger centralization than during any other period
of history in Myanmar, not only the non-Burmese and
but also Burmese ethnic nationalities are suffering
terrible atrocities. The SPDC deprives non-Burmese
ethnic people of the right of local autonomy, which
had even been permitted by earlier Burmese kings
during the three Burmese empires.
Forceful conquest and annexation can be
achieved by military prowess. Superficially, it may
appear that the military is capable of establishing
stability in Myanmar, but in essence, it has only
been creating brutal oppression, fear, injustice,
and loss of freedom for all people inside Myanmar.
In such a terrible situation, we cannot say that
national unity has been achieved. However, at the
same time, national unity can really be achieved
once the Burmese and non-Burmese ethnic
nationalities get a chance to sit together; exchange
information about past sufferings, establish common
understanding for the future and produce a new
constitution which will guarantee liberty, freedom
and development of individuals as well as ethnic
groups.
People
usually love their culture and want to practice it
freely. If their practices are not against public
health and basic rights of other people, the
practices should be allowed in respect of the
fundamental collective rights of ethnic people,
rather than just individual rights. Without paying
due respect to the different cultures of the ethnic
people in a certain country, without sharing
political power and the country's resources fairly,
and without establishing a pluralistic society,
genuine peace and stability will never be a reality
in Myanmar. While the current practice of attempting
to establish a unitary state under strong
centralization continues, countless problems will
continue. Additionally, trust among various ethnic
nationalities has been waning, and national
solidarity will never be achieved.
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